President Obama, Jordan's King Abdullah, and some other leaders are still pinning their hopes that a political solution on the Syrian situation can be found. They believe that such a solution will avert either a victory by radical Islamist forces or a breakup of the Syrian state into sectarian enclaves that could destabilize neighboring countries. However, a political solution is becoming increasingly elusive.
Indicative of this state of affairs, the UN and Arab League special envoy for Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, charged with finding such a solution, has stated that he plans to resign in the coming weeks. U.S. officials are reportedly urging Brahimi to stay on, especially in light of Secretary's Kerry's upcoming trip to Moscow, but Brahimi has expressed great frustration at not having been able to achieve anything close to his mission's goals.
Part of the reluctance by President Obama to aid the rebels with lethal military equipment is the fact that they could fall into the hands of the radical Islamist forces within the rebel camp. Although recent press reports suggest that the Obama administration may be re-considering its own ban on sending arms to the rebels, the fear that such arms might wind up in the hands of, and strengthen, radical Islamist groups like Al-Nusra front, which is aligned with Al Qaeda in Iraq, is an overriding concern. Having Damascus fall to radical Islamist forces is a nightmare scenario for Washington.
This scenario is also a nightmare for Jordan, not to mention other neighboring countries like Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel. Press reporting indicated that Jordan's King Abdullah, during his recent visit to Washington, told U.S. officials that only a political solution to the Syrian crisis will stymie efforts by radical Islamists to take power in Syria or the break up of Syria into sectarian enclaves. Abdullah reportedly added that a political solution can only take place if Assad and his inner circle leave because the rebels will not negotiate with the Syrian leader and his top military and political advisors.
Given these constraints, how can a political solution come about? One, Assad and his inner circle must be enticed, pressured, or forced to leave the country. The outside player in this scenario is Russia, which has been Syria's main benefactor outside of Iran. Secretary Kerry's upcoming visit to Moscow may be designed in large part to discuss this very issue. The inside player in this scenario is the group of Alawite military commanders who are not part of Assad's inner circle. For self-preservation reasons, they may decide at some point that sticking with Assad until the very bitter end is not in their own and their families' interests, nor in the interest of the Alawite community as a whole. Hence, they might try to force him out. More moderate elements of the Syrian opposition, sensing this unease and fear among the Alawites, have suggested that the Alawite community will be protected in a post-Assad Syria.
While these scenarios sound logical on paper, in reality they are extremely difficult to carry out. Russian officials may conclude that Assad is expendable, but convincing the Syrian leader to leave is another matter altogether. Assad has stubbornly refused to budge and somehow believes he can ride out the storm. He is unlikely to change his mind until the noose really tightens around Damascus, and even then he may opt for Plan B, which is, in essence, a strategy of "heading up to the hills," the Alawite heartland. Today's press reports noted that elements of the Syrian army and the pro-government militia massacred inhabitants of a Sunni Muslim village in the Alawite-dominated province of Latakia. This act was probably designed to "cleanse" at least part of the Alawite heartland of Sunni Muslims for an eventual mini-state or to implicate more and more Alawite military commanders in the atrocities. The more Alawite military commanders have civilian blood on their hands, the less likely they will be able to strike a deal with the opposition, as the latter has indicated it will hold such military leaders accountable. This serves to keep the Alawite military commanders loyal to Assad.
All of this suggests that a political solution is not within reach, despite the best intentions of Brahimi and others. The key questions for the Obama administration, therefore, are how to make sure the military solution ends with radical Islamists not coming out on top or Syria breaking up into sectarian enclaves. Funneling arms to more moderate elements of the Syrian rebels may be a tactic it will ultimately pursue, but that is no guarantee that the moderates will win or that Syria will stay whole.
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