Nearly six months after President Morsi issued a decree exempting his decisions from judicial review- which touched off a political firestorm in Egypt- the country is still beset with political instability and policy drift. Although Morsi rescinded most of his controversial November 22 edict, it failed to mollify the opposition, which distrusts him and wants him removed from power. Morsi has not helped to dampen this anger by his subsequent policies of trying to weaken the judiciary, which the secularists and liberals see as a check on an authoritarian president. Moreover, Morsi's recent cabinet shake-up was seen as more of the same- bringing in some members of the Brotherhood's political party and some technocrats who are sympathetic to the Brotherhood, like he did last time. Although Morsi's popularity has dropped since last year, the opposition- weak, divided, and lacking grassroots appeal- is not in a position to win a majority of seats in the next parliamentary elections, slated for October at the earliest.
Egypt remains deeply divided between supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood (along with the more fundamentalist Salafi parties) and the liberal-secularist camp. Morsi and the Brotherhood have apparently made a strategic decision to drop the idea of gradualism (once prevalent in the Brotherhood) and try to grab as much power as possible. This includes using coercion and violence by the interior ministry against his detractors, removing editors of the press not sympathetic to the Brotherhood, using the existing upper house of parliament- dominated by the Brotherhood- to pass legislation in conformity with the Brotherhood's agenda, and going after the independence of the judiciary. Morsi and the Brotherhood are aided from time-to-time by the more fundamentalist Salafi parties which, while seeing the Brotherhood as a rival, do not want the liberal-secular forces to score any gains.
The liberal-secular forces, while divided and beset with personality rivalries, have nonetheless been active in trying to oppose Morsi's policies. They are using a combination of street protests and petitions to discredit him. There is currently a campaign underway called "Tamarod" (meaning, rebel) that seeks to gather 15 million signatures from the citizenry by June 30 to force early presidential elections. The campaign has already gotten 2 million signatures and is reportedly active in 19 of Egypt's 27 provinces. The organizing group, led by former socialist presidential candidate Hamdeen Sobahi, is also planning a million man march on the presidential palace, and is supported by several liberal parties, including those led by former foreign minister, Amre Moussa, and former IAEA chief, Mohammed El-Baradei. Recent polls in Egypt have indicated that Morsi's approval rating has fallen, and the liberal-secularist camp hopes to capitalize on it.
Of course, Morsi can simply ignore the petition and use the interior ministry forces to prevent such a large demonstration from taking place. He apparently sees the opposition as holdovers from the Mubarak regime who want to block his agenda. This was most evident in his recent moves against the judiciary. Morsi and his Brotherhood allies proposed legislation to regulate the judiciary and drop the mandatory retirement age from 70 to 60, which would remove about 20 percent of all judges. Not surprisingly, the judges balked, forcing Morsi to meet with some of the them and announcing plans to hold a conference on this issue for later this month. On May 15, however, members of the Judges Club- a liberal-oriented group- declared they would not take part in such a conference because it would be a sham. It remains to be seen if Morsi and the judges will be able to work out a compromise. In this case, Morsi may have overplayed his hand.
Although Morsi's opponents are active, they are also frustrated by their inability to change the political dynamics in the country. Some within the liberal-secularist camp have even called for a return to military rule as a way of removing Morsi from power. The Egyptian military, which warned about the "collapse of the state" on January 29, 2013 because of ongoing street violence, has recently changed its tune. On May 11, Defense Minister General Abdel Fattah el-Sissi declared that "no one is going to remove anybody, and nobody should think the army has the solution." He instead called for a "framework of consensus" because the "alternative is extremely dangerous." Egyptian military officers had an unhappy experience ruling the country for 18 months after Mubarak's overthrow and do not want a repetition of that experience. Moreover, they have apparently struck a deal with Morsi to essentially be left alone. The new constitution, pushed by Morsi and passed by a public referendum in December 2012, gives the military even more autonomy than they enjoyed under Mubarak and precludes a civilian to head the Defense Ministry.
Part of the problem for the liberal-secularist camp is that, despite Morsi's falling poll numbers, they are unlikely to win a majority of seats in the elections for the lower house of parliament scheduled for October (the previous lower house of parliament was disbanded by the judiciary in 2012 for technical reasons). The liberal-secularist camp, while popular with the urban intellectual classes, does not have a large following in poor urban areas and in the rural regions, where illiteracy is still high (about a third of the population). The Islamists- both the Brotherhood and the Salafi parties- have been adept at setting up health clinics and food banks in these areas and they put out the message that a vote for them is a vote for Islam. Although some poor citizens have come to see this type of vote-buying and appeal to religion as a ruse (and this probably accounts in part for Morsi's falling poll numbers), the economic situation in Egypt is so bad at this point that many desperate people will support any group that can deliver badly-needed services.
Egypt is thus headed for more of the same in the coming months. Morsi and his Brotherhood allies will continue to be at loggerheads with the liberal-secularist camp, but the latter will be at a disadvantage politically as the autumn elections approach. Political compromise and a decision by the Brotherhood not to compete in every electoral district might change this equation, but Morsi and the Brotherhood are not inclined to give up their chance of achieving even more political power than they have now.
As for U.S. policy, the Obama administration has shifted from embracing Morsi to one of criticizing some of his undemocratic moves (such as the recent detention of youth activist Ahmed Maher) and speaking about the desire to "support the Egyptian people." The previous policy had the unintended effect of alienating nearly the entire liberal intellectual class in Egypt. The challenge for U.S. policymakers is not only to speak consistently (which it is doing now) about the need for Egypt to abide by democratic norms but to support Egypt economically in a way that will be seen on the ground. Although Egypt keenly needs an IMF agreement (and this may be signed soon), economic stabilization is only part of the answer. The United States needs to show that it is concerned about economic difficulties facing the Egyptian people (like high unemployment) and needs to devote more resources to help alleviate such problems. Although the conventional wisdom in Washington is that seeking more economic aid for Egypt now is a nonstarter with Congress, many of whose members are upset with the Morsi presidency, administration officials need to make a compelling case that Egypt is too important a country to fail, and that, if crafted right, economic aid can and should be channeled to programs that will be designed to help those in need, not the Egyptian presidential office.
[/fullwidth_text]